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AVIATION - WARSAW CONVENTION - AIRLINE CARRIER IS LIABLE FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY PASSENGERS PRIOR TO BOARDING DURING TERRORIST
ATTACK - Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550
F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
In Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.' and Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,2 the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Third and Second Circuits held that under Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention, 3 as modified by the Montreal Agreement
of 1966, 4 an airline carrier was liable for the injuries suffered by
its passengers prior to the actual boarding of the aircraft once
those boarding procedures were substantially under way. The
litigation in Day and Evangelinos arose out of the tragic events
which took place at Hellenikon Airport in Athens, Greece on
August 5, 1973. 5 At approximately 3 p.m. on that day, 89 passengers holding tickets for TWA Flight 881/5, scheduled to fly
from Athens to New York, were awaiting final boarding instructions6 in the airport transit lounge. After seven passengers had
completed routine pre-boarding inspections, two Arab terrorists,
1. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
3. The official title of the Warsaw Convention is "The Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air." It
is reproduced at 49 Stat. 3018. Article 17 provides that: 'The carrier shall be liable
for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking."
4. Agreement CAB 18900, Approved, CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg.
7302 (1966), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 note. The Montreal Agreement provides
in part that: "By this agreement, the parties thereto bind themselves to include in
their tariffs, effective May 16, 1966, a special contract in accordance with Article
22(1) of the Convention . . . providing for a limit of liability for each passenger
for death, wounding, or other bodily injury of $75,000 inclusive of legal fees .... The
parties further agree to provide in their tariffs that the carrier shall not, with respect
to any claim arising out of the death, injury, or wounding, or other bodily injury of a
passenger, avail itself of any defense under Article 20(1) of the Convention."
5. Evangelinos v. TWA, 396 F. Supp. 95; Day v. TWA, 393 F. Supp. 217.
6. 393 F. Supp. at 221. See note 37 infra.
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members of the infamous Black September terrorist organization,
opened fire on7 the crowd, killing three and injuring an additional
forty persons.
The surviving passengers and the personal representatives
of the deceased victims of the Athens attack brought separate
actions against TWA in the United States District Courts for the
Western District of Pennsylvania" and the Southern District of
New York.9 Plaintiffs sought to recover damages under the provisions of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention."0 In both cases
the plaintiffs and defendant TWA moved for summary judgment
on the issue of liability." The plaintiffs contended that the
airline was absolutely liable under the Convention; the defendants, on the other hand, argued that Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention was not applicable to the facts of the case on the
grounds that even if an "accident" had transpired, liability could
not attach because the damage sustained had not occurred on
board the aircraft or "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking."'12 (emphasis added) The district
courts in Evangelinos and Day, on the same facts, reached contrary results. In Evangelinos v. TWA,' 3 Judge Snyder of the
Western District of Pennsylvania granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on
the grounds that the plaintiffs were not "within the course of any
of the operations of embarkation" and that as a result their injuries were not incurred "as a result of an accident actionable
under the Warsaw Convention."' 4 However, in Day v. TWA, 5
Judge Brieant of the Southern District of New York ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the plaintiffs were plainly
engaged in embarkation inasmuch as they had completed five
out of a total of the eleven steps in the airline's mandatory preboarding procedures at the time the accident occurred. 16 On
7. 396 F. Supp. at 96.
8. Id. at 95.
9. 393 F. Supp. 217.
10. Supra note 3.
11. TWA did not contend that the terrorist attack did not constitute an accident
within the meaning of Article 17. 393 F. Supp. at 220.
12. Id.
13. 396 F. Supp. 95.
14. Id. at 103.
15. 393 F. Supp. 217.
16. Id. at 221.
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appeal the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the rationale
of the lower court's opinion and affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiffs. 17
In Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, the district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of liability. 8 In reaching its conclusion that the airline was
not liable for the injuries suffered by its passengers as a result
of the terrorist attack, the court relied extensively upon its interpretation of the "legislative" history of Article 17.1 The court
discussed the divergent treatments accorded to baggage and
passengers under the Warsaw Convention. 20 In an early draft,
the provisions concerning passengers and baggage were combined
and coverage was extended to both passengers and baggage "from
the time when the passengers, goods or baggage enter the airport
of departure until the time when they exit from the airport of
arrival." 21 The delegates rejected this proposal, and Draft Article
20 was split into what became Article 17 to cover passengers and
Article 18 to cover baggage. Article 18 (2) retained the broad coverage of the Draft Article as it pertained to goods and baggage.22
Article 17 covered damages pertaining to passengers within a
notably narrower sphere; that is, "if the accident which caused
the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." 23 By distinguishing the terms of coverage extended to passengers on the one hand and baggage on the other, it seems
clear that the delegates intended to restrict the scope of carrier's
liability for injuries suffered by passengers. The district court
then scrutinized the discussions of several delegates to the Con17. 528 F.2d 31 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890, 97 . Ct. 246 (1976).
18. 396 F. Supp. at 103 (1975). The court had subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 which provides: "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest or costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
19. Id. at 100. The district court deems this to be a well-established practice
repeating the dictum of Wisdom, C.J., in Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 386 F.2d 323, 336 (1967) : "the determination in an American court of the
meaning of an international convention drawn by continental jurists is hardly possible
without considering the conception, parturition, and growth of the Convention."
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id. at 100.
22. 49 Stat. at 3018-19.
23. Id.
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vention and concluded that the broadest interpretation conceived
of by the delegates would have covered passengers from the time
they left the terminal and entered the traffic apron. Moreover,
the court found that the delegates intended to define limits 24based
upon geographical factors, not on the passengers' activities.
The Evangelinos decision of the district court rests on an
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention which is in conformity
with the earlier interpretations of the First Circuit. In In Re
Tel Aviv, the carrier was held not liable for the injuries suffered
by disembarking airline passengers who were attacked by terrorists after they had entered the terminal.2 5 The district court
granted defendant carrier's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff's post-flight activities did not fall
within the scope of activities covered by the Warsaw Convention. 26 The passengers had completed their transportation by
air since they were far removed from the operation of the aircraft. Consequently, Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention was
deemed inapplicable because the plaintiffs were not "in the course
of any of the operations of disembarking." The passengers on
TWA Flight 881/5 were equally far removed from the operation
of the aircraft, gathered in the terminal building. Hence, under
the rationale of In Re Tel Aviv, the defendant TWA would not
have been held liable for the injuries suffered by its passengers
within the terminal. In MacDonald v. Air Canada,27 the plaintiff
was an arriving international airline's passenger who fell while
waiting for the delivery of her luggage in the baggage area of an
airport. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit unanimously
upheld a directed verdict dismissing her complaint on the ground
that the plaintiff's fall had not occurred in "the course of any of
the operations of disembarking. ' 2' The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit found that "the operations of disembarking" had
certainly ended once the passenger was safely within the terminal
building.29 The court justified its construction of Article 17 by
examining the purposes underlying the Warsaw Convention. The
court emphasized an intention of the delegates to shift the burden
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

396 F. Supp. at 102.
405 F. Supp. 154, 158 (1975).
Id.
439 F.2d 1402 (1971).
Id. at 1405.
Id.
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of proof to the airline when there was an air transportation accident since a plaintiff would have practical difficulty in proving
that an accident resulted from the airline's negligence.3 0 Under
the circumstances of this case where the plaintiff fell in a public
area, the rationale that difficulties of proof impose an unfair
burden on a plaintiff had no bearing.
Several foreign jurisdictions have also interpreted Article 17
with the same result that was reached by the district court in
Evangelinos v. TWA. In Mach6 v. Air France3' the French court
limited the scope of the term "in the course of operations of
embarking" to refer only to those activities which took place on
the traffic apron. In Machg, the plaintiff was being led by two
stewardesses from the airplane to the terminal when he was injured. The injury was sustained in a "customs area" located outside the traffic apron but not within the terminal itself. The
Court of Cassation held that Article 17 did not apply to the
plaintiff's accident because the Warsaw Convention regulates
ground accidents "in the course of any of the operations of embarking" only to the extent that such accidents occur in a place
where passengers are exposed to the risks of aviation. 32 In the
more recent French case of Forsius v. Air France,3" the plaintiff
was injured while in a lounge used by the passengers of various
airlines who had passed through customs. In terms of plaintiff's
location at the time of the accident, the circumstances are virtually the same as those in Evangelinos v. TWA. In Forsius,
however, the Tribunal held that the plaintiff was not involved in
any of "the operations of embarking." In Blumenfeld v. BEA, 4
a West German court held a carrier liable for the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff in falling on a staircase leading from the terminal
to the traffic apron. The court reasoned that the carrier assumed
responsibility for the care of its passengers when it requested
them to depart from the waiting room for the aircraft. While
the Berlin Court of Appeals read Article 17 more expansively
30. Id.
31. Mach6 v. Air France, judgment of April 12, 1967, Cour d'Appel de Rouen,
[1968] D.S. Jur. 515, aff'd, judgment of June 3, 1960, Cass Civ. Ire, [1960] D.S. Jur.
373. See Annot., P. Chauveau, [1968] D.S. Jur. 517; Annot., P. Chauveau, [19701
D.S. Jur. 374.
32. Id.
33. Rev. Fr. Droit Aerien 216 (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 1973).
34. Judgment of March 11, 1961, Kammergericht Berlin, [1961] N.J.W. 1170.
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than the French courts, an essential element of its holding that
the plaintiff was "in the course of the operations of embarking"
was that she sustained the injury in a location outside the terminal. Foreign courts have been notably reluctant to construe
"the operation of embarking or disembarking" so broadly as to
apply to the injuries suffered within the terminal. There is,
however, one significant feature that distinguishes the cited
foreign cases from the Evangelinos case. The injuries suffered
by the various plaintiffs in the French and West German cases
were not at all extraordinary; quite simply, each one fell and
was injured. The injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in Evangelinos
were perpetrated by terrorists engaged in an activity that could
reasonably be viewed as a risk that inheres in modem aviation.
The interpretation of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention of
the district court in Evangelinos v. TWA conforms with the prevailing authority of other signatories to the treaty and with
American authority prior to the decision in Day v. TWA.
In Day v. TWA35 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit diverged from the traditionally narrower
constructions of Article 17 and found that the injuries sustained
by the passengers during the terrorist attack took place "in the
course of the operations of embarking." The court focused its
analysis on three factual issues: (1) the passengers' activities
at the time of the accident, (2) the degree of control exercised by
the airline over these activities, and (3) the location of the
passengers at the time of the accident. 6 The Second Circuit
adopted the factual analysis of the lower court which found
that the passengers had to follow eleven steps in order to board
the aircraft.
The passengers had gone through five of the
enumerated steps when the terrorists struck. The court concluded that the passengers were "in the course of the operations
of embarking" at the moment of attack. Significantly, the pas35. 528 F.2d 31.

36. Id.
37. 393 F. Supp. at 221. The eleven enumerated steps were (1) the presentation
of the passengers' tickets at the TWA check-in-desk, (2) obtaining boarding passes,
(3) obtaining baggage checks, (4) obtaining a seat assignment, (5) passing through
passport and currency controls of Greek authorities, (6) submission to a personal
search for explosives and weapons by Greek police, (7) submission of carry-on
baggage to a similar inspection, (8) passing through Gate 4 to a bus, (9) boarding
the bus, (10) riding the bus to the airplane, (11) leaving the bus and entering the
airplane.
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sengers had not yet submitted to a search of their persons and
hand baggage for weapons, nor had they passed through the gate
leading to the bus which they were scheduled to board for the
short ride to the airplane. The Second Circuit viewed these eleven
steps as involuntary acts which gave the defendant control over
the passengers' activities and concomitant responsibility for any
injuries they suffered. 8
The court discussed the legislative history of the Warsaw
Convention to substantiate its construction of Article 17 and
its ultimate finding of liability. The analysis of the various
proposals for Article 17 during the drafting stages helped the
court to go beyond the traditional location-based test proposed
by the defendant. 9 As adopted, the language of Article 17 represented a rejection by the delegates of more radical proposals
concerning the scope of liability of the carrier for accidents sustained by its passengers. 40 The court inferred from the adoption
of this moderate view that the delegates did not intend a rigid
rule based exclusively on the passengers' spatial location to determine the carrier's liability.41 The court concluded that the legislative history of Article 17 did not preclude the application of a
tripartite test which would allow the court to consider whether
the high degree of control exercised by the airline over the passengers coupled with the adherence of the passengers to the
38. 528 F.2d at 33-34.
39. Id. at 33. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the applicability of
Article 17 depended solely upon the passengers' location at the time of the accident.
Traditionally courts had not considered passengers within the terminal to be engaged
in "any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."
40. Id. at 35. In the Court's view, the Convention adopted the moderate
position proposed by Prof. George Ripert, the French delegate. The Comite Internationale Technique d'Experts Juridique Ariens (CITEJA) had prepared a draft at
the Paris Convention of 1925 which would have extended coverage to passengers
"from the time when [they] enter the Airport to departure until the time when
they exit from the Airport of arrival." Against this far-reaching proposal, was a
severely constrictive proposal promulgated by the Brazilian delegate, A. Pecanha;
in which liability did not attach until the passengers had boarded the aircraft. Between
these two poles stood Ripert's suggestion that the Convention should adopt language
of sufficient latitude to allow for the diverse cases that would confront courts in
applying the provisions.
41. Id. Whether this was the intent of the delegate is difficult to say. Prof.
Ripert suggested that they intended to leave the resolution of the issue to the courts
on the basis of a factual inquiry in each case.
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airline's pre-boarding procedures placed them within the ambit
of Article 17.42
The plaintiffs in the Evangelinos litigation appealed to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed in favor of the
plaintiffs, relying heavily on the Second Circuit's opinion in Day
v. TWA, handed down six months earlier. The extensive control
of the airline over the passengers brought them within the meaning of Article 17.3
The emerging American construction of Article 17 is typified
by the opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Third Circuits in the Day and Evangelinos decisions."
42. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also took into account considerations of public policy. The court articulated three reasons why the cost of the
injuries suffered by the passengers are more justly borne by the carrier than by
the passengers themselves. First, the carrier may adjust its tai'iff so as to spread
the costs of such accidents among the larger class of airline passengers. The distribution of such costs alleviates "what would otherwise be a crushing burden to those few
unfortunate enough to become accident victims." 528 F.2d at 34. Secondly, the prevention of such accidents can be economically accomplished by the airlines rather
than the passengers. See G. CALEBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 152 (1970). Of the
involved parties, the carrier is in the best position to contribute directly to the deterrence of terrorist attacks. Thirdly, the administrative costs to the plaintiffs to
maintain an action against the owner of an airport in another nation would be
prohibitive. To disallow a suit against the carrier under Article 17 would leave to
the plaintiffs this costly alternative.
43. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d at 155.
44. There remains, however, some judicial reticence to adopt the more expansive
judicial construction of liability under the Warsaw Convention. In the recent case
of Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir., 1976), the First Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the decision in In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 155 (D.P.R.
1975). The passengers had descended the airplane's stairs and then proceeded by
bus or on foot to the air terminal situated more than one-third of a mile from the
airplane. Immigration authorities inspected the passengers who then awaited the
arrival of their luggage. As they stood in the main baggage area, three terrorists
fired submachine guns into the crowd causing the deaths and injuries giving rise
to the plaintiffs' cause of action. The plaintiffs sued Air France under Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement claiming that the
carrier was liable since the passengers were allegedly "in the course of the operations
of disembarking." The appellate court rejected the plaintiffs appeal and affirmed the
lower court's decision, concluding that the passengers were entitled to recover damages.
The court attempted to reconcile its holding, namely, that passengers who
are simply awaiting the arrival of their luggage have severed their relationship with
the air carrier for the purposes of Article 17, with the test adopted by the Second and
Third Circuits in the Day and Evangelinos cases on factual grounds. First, the
passengers were not engaged "in any activity relating to effecting their separation
from the aircraft." Id. at 282. Secondly, the airline did not exercise the requisite
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The United States Supreme Court has denied TWA's petition
for certiorari in Day v. TWA. 4 5 Previously, no court, domestic or
foreign, had found passengers within an airport's terminal to
be within the ambit of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
While American and foreign courts may eventually reach uniform results, there is presently some uncertainty as to the extent
of the coverage of Article 17. If greater uniformity in the application of Article 17 is desired, the signatory nations might consider amending the Warsaw Convention in order to clarify the
standard which courts should apply in incidents such as those
in Day and Evangelinos. Amendment of the treaty would, however, involve substantial practical and diplomatic difficulties. It
is not at all clear that all nations would favor the expansive
formula laid down by the United States Circuit Courts. If uniformity is not attainable, or if it is not deemed to be desirable,
the question becomes whether the results of an expansive construction of Article 17 are equitable. By assuming an active
role, American courts may prove capable of adapting to the
rapidly evolving problems of aviation and encouraging airlines to
insure the safety of their passengers more effectively.46
William Helfand

degree of control over the passengers' activities; Air France did not prescribe
procedures which the passengers were obliged to follow in retrieving their luggage. Id. Finally, the court did not concur in the policy judgments made by the courts
in Evangelinos and Day that the airline should be liable for injuries suffered at
the hands of terrorists. In support of its position, the court pointed out that there
was no logical nexus between the injury and air travel itself since terrorist attacks
occurred in a multitude of circumstances. Furthermore, the court stated that the
remedies provided by local law would usually suffice to allow persons injured by
terrorist attacks to recover for their injuries.
45. Supra note 17.
46. See generally, Comment, An Interpretation of the "Embarking" and "Disembarking" Requirements of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 16 COLum. J.
INT'L

L. 705 (1977).

